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Abstract
Matrix multiplication is one of the key operations in various engineering applications. Outsourcing large-scale matrix
multiplication tasks to multiple distributed servers or cloud is desirable to speed up computation. However, security becomes
an issue when these servers are untrustworthy. In this paper, we study the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication
from distributed untrustworthy servers. This problem falls in the category of secure function computation and has received
significant attention in the cryptography community. However, the fundamental limits of information-theoretically secure matrix
multiplication remain an open problem. We focus on information-theoretically secure distributed matrix multiplication with the
goal of characterizing the minimum communication overhead. The capacity of secure matrix multiplication is defined as the
maximum possible ratio of the desired information and the total communication received from N distributed servers. In particular,
we study the following two models where we want to multiply two matrices A ∈ Fm×n and B ∈ Fn×p: (a) one-sided secure
matrix multiplication with ` colluding servers, in which B is a public matrix available at all servers and A is a private matrix. (b)
fully secure matrix multiplication with ` colluding servers, in which both A and B are private matrices. The goal is to securely
multiply A and B when any ` servers can collude. For model (a), we characterize the capacity as C(`)one-sided = (N − `)/N by
providing a secure matrix multiplication scheme and a matching converse. For model (b), we propose a novel scheme that lower
bounds the capacity, i.e., C(`)fully ≥ (d
√
N − `e)2/(d√N − `e+ `)2.
Keywords – Matrix Multiplication, Security, Secret Sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of Big Data, performing computationally intensive operations on a local machine becomes challenging and
inefficient. Relying on powerful distributed servers is desirable for improving efficiency. As clients, users can upload their data
onto servers, and let servers perform computationally expensive tasks for them. However, if the servers are untrustworthy and
the data contain sensitive information, it raises security concerns. Therefore, designing algorithms to take advantage of the
powerful untrusted servers while keeping them from learning anything about input data is of significant interest.
Cryptography community has looked at this problem under the secure multi-party computation framework, also known as
secure function evaluation. In a secure function evaluation problem, parties want to jointly compute a function without revealing
their respective input to other parties. For example, Alice, who has input x, wants to compute f (x, y) without leaking x to
Bob, who has input y, where f is some function they want to compute jointly. Similarly, Bob does not want to reveal y to
Alice. Alice and Bob should not learn anything about each other’s input from the result of the computation, either. Some
previous works include secure two-party computation [1] which proposed using one-way functions to achieve security, and
secure multi-party computation [2], [3] to name a few. A class of encryption schemes called Fully Homomorphic Encryption
guarantees that any unencrypted items, including the inputs, any intermediate values and the outputs will not be leaked to
unintended party. Naturally, it is often used as a solution to secure function evaluation problems and other types of security
problems [4], [5].
Matrix multiplication is a fundamental building block of many science and engineering fields, such as machine learning,
image and signal processing, wireless communication, optimization and so on. In this paper, we focus on the problem of
secure distributed matrix multiplication. Secure matrix multiplication has been studied in cryptography community, and different
approaches have been proposed, including a weaker version of fully homomorphic encryption, namely partially homomorphic
encryption [6]–[8].
In contrast to the focus of cryptography community, there are not many works on secure matrix multiplication using
information theoretic tools. A lot of efforts are put in further speeding up computation and reducing communication overhead
using codes when it comes to distributed matrix multiplication in information theory community. Several recent works include
[9]–[11]. These works speed up matrix multiplication and reduce communication overhead by adding redundancy to the
computation using codes. The authors showed that the added redundancy allows the distributed system to tolerate servers who
do not respond in a timely manner and mitigate stragglers, and allows the user and servers to communicate less.
Main Contributions: In this work, we wish to combine the desirable features of works in both communities, and devise
schemes that are both (a) information-theoretically secure; and (b) have the smallest communication overhead. We consider a
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Fig. 1: (a) One-sided secure matrix multiplication. (b) Fully secure matrix multiplication.
system including one user connected to N servers. We assume that servers are honest, but curious. The user wishes to multiply
A ∈ Fm×n and B ∈ Fn×p. We consider this problem under two different models.
• We first study the model where B is a public matrix available at all servers, and A is private. The goal is to compute
AB securely when any ` servers may collude. We devise a capacity achieving scheme based on Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme [12]. We derive an information-theoretic converse proof and show that the capacity is (N − `)/N . This result
shows that for a scheme to be secured against any ` colluding servers, the price we have to pay is `/N .
• We next study the model where both A and B are private matrices with the same goal when any ` servers can collude. We
devise a novel achievable scheme inspired by the recent works, [9], [10], which show how to leverage codes for distributed
matrix multiplication. For this model, our scheme achieves a rate of (d√N − `e)2/(d√N − `e+ `)2. We also show that
there is room for improvement and provide an example of the improved scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the system and problem statement in Section II. We present
the capacity achieving scheme and the converse proof for the one-sided secure matrix multiplication in Section III, and the
achievable scheme for the fully secure matrix multiplication in Section IV. We conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a problem where there are N servers, and a user who wants to compute the product of two input matrices
A ∈ Fm×n and B ∈ Fn×p securely, i.e., AB, using N servers, for some integer m,n and p, and a sufficiently large field F.
The user is connected to each server through a private link (see Fig. 1) and we assume that the servers are honest, but curious.
In order to prevent servers from learning about input matrices, the user sends securely encoded versions of input matrices to
servers. We define the encoding functions as,
f = (f1, f2, . . . , fN ), g = (g1, g2, . . . , gN ), (1)
where fi and gi are the encoding functions for server i. The encoded matrices for server i are denoted by A˜i and B˜i for two
input matrices for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , i.e.,
A˜i = fi(A), B˜i = gi(B). (2)
The dimensions of A˜i and B˜i vary depending on the scheme used. We denote the answer from server i as Zi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
From all answers Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN , the user must be able to decode the desired result AB. We define the decoding function as
d(.), therefore, AB = d(Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN ). Hence, decodability constraint can be written as,
H(AB|Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN ) = 0. (3)
In this paper, we study the following two models:
(a) One-Sided Secure Matrix Multiplication with ` Colluding Servers: In this model, B is a public arbitrary constant matrix
available at all servers, where A is a private random matrix at the user. Our goal is to securely multiply A and B without
revealing anything about A even when any ` servers may collude (see Fig. 1(a)), i.e., colluding servers can gather their
respective received matrix A˜i and attempt to learn about A. The user does not know which ` servers may collude. We use the
index set L = {i1, i2, . . . , i`} ⊆ [1 : N ], |L| = ` to denote a subset of ` servers, and A˜L , (A˜i1 , A˜i2 , . . . , A˜i`) to denote the
corresponding encoded version of A sent to servers in the set L. For a scheme in this setting to be considered secured, the
3encoded matrices A˜L,∀L ⊆ [1 : N ], |L| = ` must not leak anything about A. Thus, a scheme for this model must satisfy the
following security constraint,
I(A; A˜L) = 0,∀L ⊆ [1 : N ], |L| = `. (4)
We say that the rate R is achievable if there exists a scheme satisfying the decodability and security constraints, i.e., (3) and
(4). The rate is characterized by the number of desired bits per download bit. The rate is defined as,
R =
H(AB)
N∑
i=1
H(Zi)
. (5)
The capacity C(`)one-sided is the supremum of R over all feasible schemes for this model.
(b) Fully Secure Matrix Multiplication with ` Colluding Servers: In this model, both A and B are private matrices at the
user. Our goal is to multiply them securely when any ` servers may collude (see Fig. 1(b)). Hence, encoded matrices A˜L and
B˜L,∀L ⊆ [1 : N ], |L| = ` must not reveal anything about A and B. The security constraint for this model is,
I(A,B; A˜L, B˜L) = 0,∀L ⊆ [1 : N ], |L| = `. (6)
We say that the rate R is achievable if there exits a scheme for which it satisfies both (3) and (6). Similarly, C(`)fully is defined
as the supremum of achievable rates for the fully secure matrix multiplication problem. It is clear that C(`)one-sided ≥ C(`)fully. In the
next two sections, we present our main results towards characterizing these capacities.
III. ONE-SIDED SECURE MATRIX MULTIPLICATION WITH ` COLLUDING SERVERS
We first study the model where B is public and known at all servers, and the user wants to securely compute AB without
revealing A to any ` colluding servers. We present our proposed scheme, followed by a converse proof to show that the scheme
is information-theoretically optimal.
Theorem 1. For the (N, `) one-sided secure matrix multiplication problem, in which B is known everywhere and A is kept
hidden from any ` colluding servers while computing AB, the capacity is given by
C
(`)
one-sided =
N − `
N
. (7)
Before presenting the achievable scheme, we first show an example to highlight the intuition behind the scheme.
Example 1. (N = 4, ` = 2) Consider a one-sided secure matrix multiplication problem with 4 servers, and any 2 of them can
collude. The user partitions A into
A =
[
A1
A2
]
, (8)
where A1, A2 ∈ F(m/2)×n. The original matrix multiplication can be rewritten as,
AB =
[
A1B
A2B
]
. (9)
The goal is now to recover A1B and A2B. The user generates 2 random matrices, i.e., K1,K2 ∈ F(m/2)×n, whose entries are
i.i.d. uniform random variables from the field F, and encodes the matrix for server i as,
A˜i = A1 + iA2 + i
2K1 + i
3K2, (10)
where each A˜i has the same dimension as A1 and A2 for all i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Server i computes A˜iB and returns the result to
the user. The results received at the user are,
Z1 = A˜1B = A1B +A2B +K1B +K2B,
Z2 = A˜2B = A1B + 2A2B + 4K1B + 8K2B,
Z3 = A˜3B = A1B + 3A2B + 9K1B + 27K2B,
Z4 = A˜4B = A1B + 4A2B + 16K1B + 64K2B. (11)
Clearly, the results can be viewed as a system of 4 equations in 4 matrices, and rewritten in matrix form as,
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
 =

10 11 12 13
20 21 22 23
30 31 32 33
40 41 42 43


A1B
A2B
K1B
K2B
 . (12)
4Since the coefficient matrix is a Vandermonde matrix, the system is invertible with a unique solution. The user can multiply the
inverse of the coefficient matrix on both sides and solve for A1B and A2B. However, for any 2 servers, they see a system of 2
equations in 4 matrices, hence, they will not be able to solve for A1B and A2B. The user is able to recover 2 desired items
from a total of 4 items, hence, achieving a rate of 1/2.
Proof of Theorem 1
We next present the generalized achievable scheme. We show that the capacity can be achieved by a modified Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme, and we derive an information-theoretic converse proof for optimality.
A. Achievable Scheme
For the achievable scheme, the user first divides A into N − ` submatrices vertically, i.e.,
A = [A1 A2 . . . AN−`]T , (13)
where Ai ∈ F(m/(N−`))×n, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − `. Then the matrix multiplication can be written as
AB = [A1B . . . AN−`B]T . (14)
The goal is to recover A1B, . . . , AN−`B. The user then encodes the submatrices of A into the following form,
A˜i =
N−∑`
j=1
Ajx
j−1
i +
∑`
k=1
Kkx
k+(N−`)−1
i , (15)
where the dimension of A˜i is the same as any Ai, and xi is a distinct non-zero element in F assigned to server i. All random
matrices, K1, . . . ,K` ∈ F(m/(N−`))×n, are generated i.i.d. uniformly at random. (15) can be seen as a polynomial evaluated at
point xi. Servers then multiply their received A˜i’s with B and return the following polynomial,
h(x) =
N−∑`
j=1
AjBx
j−1 +
∑`
k=1
KkBx
k+(N−`)−1, (16)
at x = xi, i = 1, . . . , N . Recall that the goal is to recover A1B, . . . , AN−`B from all Zi, i.e., h(xi), i = 1, . . . , N . As shown
in the example, due to the design of the scheme, the answers can be seen as a system of N equations in N matrices. Since the
coefficient matrix is a Vandermonde matrix, the user can multiply the inverse of the coefficient matrix and solve for the desired
items. However, a more efficient decoding method is to view each answer Zi as a degree N − 1 polynomial evaluated at point
xi. The coefficients of a degree N − 1 polynomial can be recovered with N evaluations by polynomial interpolation. Since we
can recover N − ` desired items from N answers, we achieve a rate of (N − `)/N .
We next prove that the scheme is secure, i.e., the security constraint (4) is satisfied. We start from the following sequence of
inequalities:
I(A; A˜L) = I(A; A˜i1 , . . . , A˜i`)
= H(A˜i1 , . . . , A˜i`)−H(A˜i1 , . . . , A˜i` |A)
(a)
= H(A˜i1 , . . . , A˜i`)−H(K1, . . . ,K`)
(b)
= H(A˜i1 , . . . , A˜i`)− `
mn
N − ` log |F|
(c)
≤ H(A˜i1) + · · ·+H(A˜i`)− `
mn
N − ` log |F|
(d)
= `
mn
N − ` log |F| − `
mn
N − ` log |F| = 0, (17)
where (a) follows from (15) and the fact that all random matrices Kj’s are independent of A, and (b) due to the entropy
of a uniformly distributed random variable being log |F| and the dimension of each one of the ` random matrices Kj being
mn/(N − `), (c) follows by upper bounding the joint entropy using the sum of individual entropies and (d) follows from
the argument similar to (b). Since mutual information is non-negative and it is upper bounded by zero, we conclude that the
scheme is information-theoretically secure.
5B. Converse
We start the converse proof from the following sequence of inequalities:
H(AB) = H(AB)−H(AB|Z1, . . . , ZN ) +H(AB|Z1, . . . , ZN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(a)
= I(AB;Z1, . . . ZN )
= H(Z1, . . . , ZN )−H(Z1, . . . , ZN |AB)
(b)
≤ H(Z1, . . . , ZN )−H(Zi1 , . . . , Zi` |AB)
(c)
= H(Z1, . . . , ZN )−H(ZL), (18)
where (a) is due to decodability constraint (3), (b) follows by lower bounding the joint entropy of N items using the joint
entropy of ` items, (c) follows from the Markov Chain A → A˜L → ZL and the fact that from data-processing inequality,
we know I(A; A˜L) ≥ I(A;ZL), which is greater than I(AB;ZL). This indicates that I(AB;ZL) = 0, hence, we get
H(ZL|AB) = H(ZL),L ⊆ {1, . . . , N}, |L| = `. Since there are
(
N
`
)
possible subsets L of servers of size `, we sum up their
entropy and have, (
N
`
)
H(AB) ≤
(
N
`
)
H(Z1, . . . , ZN )−
∑
|L|=`
L⊆{1,...,N}
H(ZL). (19)
Rearranging (19), we have,
H(AB) ≤ H(Z1, . . . , ZN )− ` 1(N
`
) ∑
|L|=`
L⊆{1,...,N}
H(ZL)
`
(a)
≤ H(Z1, . . . , ZN )− `H(Z1, . . . , ZN )
N
=
(
1− `
N
)
H(Z1, . . . , ZN )
(b)
≤
(
N − `
N
) N∑
i=1
H(Zi), (20)
where in (a) we apply Han’s inequality [13, Chapter 17] to bound the second term and (b) follows by bounding the joint
entropy using the sum of entropies. From (20), we get
R
(`)
one-sided =
H(AB)
N∑
i=1
H(Zi)
≤ N − `
N
. (21)
Hence, from the upper bound in (21) and a matching scheme in Section III-A, we conclude that the capacity for the one-sided
matrix multiplication problem is C(`)one-sided = (N − `)/N . This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. FULLY SECURE MATRIX MULTIPLICATION WITH ` COLLUDING SERVERS
We next investigate the case where the user wants to compute AB securely while keeping A and B information-theoretically
secure from any ` colluding servers. We next present our main result for the fully secure matrix multiplication in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 2. For the (N, `) fully secure matrix multiplication problem, in which both A and B must be kept secure from any `
colluding servers while computing AB, we have the following lower bound on the capacity:
C
(`)
fully ≥
(d√N − `e)2
(d√N − `e+ `)2 . (22)
Before presenting the proposed scheme, we first compare the achievable rate of the proposed fully secure scheme to the
capacity of the one-sided secure matrix multiplication problem. Clearly, due to a stronger security requirement, it is clear
that the rate of the proposed fully secure scheme to be lower than the capacity of the one-sided secure matrix multiplication
problem, when the number of colluding servers ` is fixed at a certain value. In Fig. 2, we let ` = 1 and increase the number of
total servers N . It can be seen that the rate of the the proposed scheme of Theorem 2 is lower, compare to the rate of Theorem
1. Notably, both schemes converge to 1 asymptotically as N →∞, however, the convergence for Theorem 1 is faster than the
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Fig. 2: Comparison between the communication rates of One-sided and Fully secure schemes for ` = 1 as N is varied.
convergence for Theorem 2. We can also see from Fig. 3, that the rate of the proposed scheme decreases a lot faster than the
capacity of the one-sided secure matrix multiplication problem when N is fixed to 100 and ` is changing. This indicates that
our proposed scheme cannot tolerate too many colluding servers due to the
√
N term in (22). We next present the proposed
scheme in detail.
A. Proof of Theorem 2
For the (N, `) fully secure matrix multiplication problem, the user wishes to compute AB securely without revealing either
A or B when any ` servers may collude. The user breaks the input matrices into r submatrices, where r = d√N − `e. The
reason for choosing this value of r will become clear when we fully describe the scheme next. The submatrices are,
A =

A1
A2
...
Ar
 and B = [B1 B2 . . . Br] , (23)
where Ai ∈ F(m/r)×n and Bi ∈ Fn×(p/r),∀i. Hence, we write the matrix multiplication AB as,
A1
A2
...
Ar
 [B1 B2 . . . Br] =

A1B1 A1B2 . . . A1Br
A2B1 A2B2 . . . A2Br
...
...
. . .
...
ArB1 ArB2 . . . ArBr
 , (24)
where the original matrix multiplication can be seen as composed of r2 smaller matrix multiplications.
Similar to one-sided secure matrix multiplication problem, the user generates ` random matrices KA1 , . . . ,KA` ∈ F(m/r)×n
for A, and ` random matrices KB1 , . . . ,KB` ∈ Fn×(p/r) for B, where each of their entries is an i.i.d. uniform random variable.
The user encodes A and B for server i as follows:
A˜i =
r∑
j=1
Ajx
j−1
i +
∑`
k=1
KAkx
k+r−1
i , (25)
B˜i =
r∑
j=1
Bjx
(j−1)(r+`)
i +
∑`
k=1
KBkx
(k+r−1)(r+`)
i , (26)
where A˜i ∈ F(m/r)×n and B˜i ∈ Fn×(p/r). The degrees of (25) and (26) are chosen in a way that each item is guaranteed
to be the only item at a certain degree after multiplication. This methodology is similar to the one proposed in [9], [10] for
distributed matrix multiplication problem. Essentially, computing A˜iB˜i is equivalent to evaluating the following polynomial
with 4 different types of terms:
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Fig. 3: The impact of number of colluding servers on the communication rate when N = 100.
h(x) =
r∑
j=1
r∑
j′=1
AjBj′x
j+(j′−1)(r+`)−1
+
r∑
j=1
∑`
k′=1
AjKBk′x
j+(k′+r−1)(r+`)−1
+
∑`
k=1
r∑
j′=1
KAkBj′x
k+r+(j′−1)(r+`)−1
+
∑`
k=1
∑`
k′=1
KAkKBk′x
k+r+(k′+r−1)(r+`)−1. (27)
Due to the design of the scheme, each degree has exactly one item as its coefficient in (27). Note that the polynomial has degree
(r+`)2−1, hence, evaluations at (r+`)2 distinct points are sufficient to solve for all coefficients of the polynomial. This indicates
that we need at least (r+ `)2 responses, one from each server to recover the desired result, i.e., N ≥ (r+ `)2. However, the user
is only interested in the first double summation term in (27), which has a total of r2 items in the form of AjBj′ . Since the user
can recover r2 items out of (r+ `)2 items, the achievable scheme yields a rate of r2/(r+ `)2 = (d√N − `e)2/(d√N − `e+ `)2.
We next show that the proposed scheme is information-theoretically secure:
I(A,B; A˜L, B˜L)
= I(A,B; A˜L) + I(A,B; B˜L|A˜L)
= H(A˜L)−H(A˜L|A,B) +H(B˜L|A˜L)−H(B˜L|A˜L, A,B)
(a)
= H(A˜L)−H(KA1 , . . . ,KA`) +H(B˜L)−H(KB1 , . . . ,KB`)
(b)
= H(A˜L)− `mn
r
log |F|+H(B˜L)− `np
r
log |F|
(c)
≤ H(A˜i1) + · · ·+H(A˜i`)− `
mn
r
log |F|+H(B˜i1) + · · ·+H(B˜i`)− `
np
r
log |F|
(d)
= `
mn
r
log |F| − `mn
r
log |F|+ `np
r
log |F| − `np
r
log |F|
= 0, (28)
where (a) follows from (25), (26) and the fact that random matrices are independent of A and B, and B˜L is independent of
A˜L, (b) follows by summing the entropy of each uniformly distributed random variable in all KAj and KBj′ , (c) follows by
upper bounding the joint entropy using the sum of individual entropies, (d) follows from the argument similar to (b). Hence,
the proposed scheme is information-theoretically secure. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
8B. Improving Theorem 2 by Aligned Secret Sharing
Due to the design of our proposed scheme, each item is the coefficient of a distinct degree. However, in a fully secure matrix
multiplication problem, only items with the form of AjBj′ are useful. Hence, if we can ensure that each item with the form of
AjBj′ is the only coefficient of some distinct degrees while aligning the other undesired items, potentially, we can achieve a
better rate. We present the following example to demonstrate the idea of aligned secret sharing.
Example 2. Consider the (8, 1) fully secure matrix multiplication problem where there are 8 servers, and none of them collude.
For this example, from Theorem 2, we can achieve a rate of (d√N − `e)2/(d√N − `e+ `)2 = 22/(2 + 1)2 = 4/9. We now
show how to improve upon this rate through the aligned secret sharing scheme.
The user partitions A and B into the following
A =
[
A1
A2
]
and B =
[
B1 B2
]
, (29)
where A1, A2 ∈ F(m/2)×n, and B1, B2 ∈ Fn×(p/2). The user generates one random matrix for each A and B, i.e., KA ∈
F(m/2)×n and KB ∈ Fn×(p/2). Instead of following the proposed scheme in Section IV-A, we align the undesired terms in the
forms of AjKB ,KABj′ and KAKB by selecting different degrees for the encoding polynomial. For each server, the encoding
of the user is:
A˜i = A1 +A2xi +KAx
2
i (30)
B˜i = B1 +B2x
3
i +KBx
5
i , (31)
where A˜i and B˜i have the same dimension as Ai and Bi for i = 1, . . . , 8. Each server i evaluates the polynomial
h(xi) = A1B1 +A2B1xi +KAB1x
2
i +A1B2x
3
i +A2B2x
4
i + (KAB2 +A1KB)x
5
i +A2KBx
6
i +KAKBx
7
i , (32)
for i = 1, . . . , 8. Clearly, the desired items are the only coefficients of their respective degrees, consequently, the user can
decode them using polynomial interpolation. Since the degree of the polynomial is now 7, evaluation at 8 points are sufficient
and there are 4 desired items. The rate is now 4/8 = 1/2 which is larger than 4/9.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied one-sided and fully secure matrix multiplication problems. We proposed a secret sharing based
scheme for the one-sided secure matrix multiplication model, where B is a public matrix and A is a private matrix that must not
be learned by servers while computing AB when any ` servers may collude. We completely characterized the capacity for the
communication overhead as (N − `)/N . We also presented a novel achievable scheme for the fully secure matrix multiplication
model, where both A and B are private matrices that must not be learned by servers when any ` of them may collude. We also
presented an improvement for this general scheme through the idea of aligned secret sharing. There are several interesting open
problems: (a) finding a converse (upper bound) for the fully secure matrix multiplication problem; and (b) general these ideas
for other secure distributed computation tasks.
REFERENCES
[1] A. C. Yao, “Protocols for secure computations,” in 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Nov. 1982, pp. 160–164.
[2] D. Chaum, I. B. Damga˚rd, and J. van de Graaf, “Multiparty computations ensuring privacy of each party’s input and correctness of the result,” in
Advances in Cryptology. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988, pp. 87–119.
[3] M. Jakobsson and A. Juels, “Mix and match: Secure function evaluation via ciphertexts,” in Advances in Cryptology. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2000, pp. 162–177.
[4] S. Rane, W. Sun, and A. Vetro, “Secure function evaluation based on secret sharing and homomorphic encryption,” in 47th Annual Allerton Conference
on Communication, Control, and Computing, Sep. 2009, pp. 827–834.
[5] M. Van Dijk, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, and V. Vaikuntanathan, “Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers,” in Annual International Conference on the
Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 2010, pp. 24–43.
[6] K. M. Khan and M. Shaheen, “Secure cloud services: Matrix multiplication revisited,” in 2013 IEEE 16th International Conference on Computational
Science and Engineering, Dec. 2013, pp. 9–14.
[7] X. Bultel, R. Ciucanu, M. Giraud, and P. Lafourcade, “Secure matrix multiplication with mapreduce,” in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Availability, Reliability and Security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017, pp. 11:1–11:10.
[8] D. H. Duong, P. K. Mishra, and M. Yasuda, “Efficient secure matrix multiplication over lwe-based homomorphic encryption,” Tatra Mountains Mathematical
Publications, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 69–83, 2016.
[9] Q. Yu, M. A. Maddah-Ali, and A. S. Avestimehr, “Polynomial codes: an optimal design for high-dimensional coded matrix multiplication,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1705.10464, 2017. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.10464
[10] ——, “Straggler mitigation in distributed matrix multiplication: Fundamental limits and optimal coding,” CoRR, vol. abs/1801.07487, 2018. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1801.07487
[11] S. Dutta, M. Fahim, F. Haddadpour, H. Jeong, V. R. Cadambe, and P. Grover, “On the optimal recovery threshold of coded matrix multiplication,” CoRR,
vol. abs/1801.10292, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1801.10292
[12] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612–613, Nov. 1979.
[13] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. Wiley-Interscience, 2006.
